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Pour une industrie 
européenne de défense 
L’une des avancées du traité de 
Lisbonne est de consacrer la 
compétence de l’Union européenne 
(article 42) en matière de politique de 
défense, permettant ainsi de donner 
un souffle nouveau à l’Agence 
européenne de défense née en 2004 
et à la base industrielle et 
technologique de défense adoptée en 
2007.  
Cette perspective apparaît d’autant 
plus pertinente que la politique de 
défense, longtemps considérée 
comme un domaine réservé des 
Etats, voit aujourd’hui les budgets 
nationaux qui lui sont consacrés 
baisser de façon drastique.  
Or, dans un contexte géopolitique où 
les menaces perdurent et où l’Europe 
a vocation à demeurer l’un des 
acteurs majeurs sur la scène 
internationale, il est indispensable 
que l’Europe gagne en puissance, en 
autonomie, bref en crédibilité dans le 
domaine de la défense. 
C’est tout le sens du propos de José 
Manuel Barroso, qui dans son 
discours sur l’état de l’Union en 
septembre 2011 rappelait que l’UE 
devait  développer une base 
industrielle européenne de défense. 
Cette volonté se justifie tout d’abord 
sur le plan économique : encourager 
les Européens à pratiquer la 
mutualisation et le partage (pooling and 
sharing) des capacités militaires à 
l’échelle européenne serait bénéfique 
en termes de R&D, de synergies, de 
s o u t i e n  a u x  n é c e s s a i r e s 
restructurations et de contribution à 
la croissance et à l’emploi au sein de 
l’Union, et in fine à la création d’un 
véritable marché intérieur de 
l’industrie de défense européenne. 
Au-delà, il y a tout l’enjeu de 
l’influence de l’UE sur la scène 
internationale et de son affirmation 
comme un acteur global de premier 
rang, pouvant justifier à terme de 
nouvelles avancées de l’intégration 
européenne.  
La Commission européenne est 
p l e i n e m e n t  c o n s c i e n t e  d e 
l’importance majeure de ce sujet. 
C’est pourquoi elle a créé récemment 
une taskforce exclus ivement 
consacrée à la défense, qui réunit les 
directions générales et services 
concernés, en vue de conforter une 
vision commune. Vous trouverez ci-
après de plus amples informations 
sur cette taskforce et sur les aspects 
stratégiques qui y sont liés.  
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After the US, the EU as a whole still holds the 
world’s most advanced military capacity, 
although emerging powers in East Asia and 
Latin America are catching up quickly and 
President Putin’s Russia seems set to reinvest 
significantly in this sector. The same is true for 
the industrial and technological capabilities 
needed to develop and produce equipment for 
the armed forces. 
At the same time, following the sharp cuts in 
public expenditure prompted by the crisis, 
national defence budgets are being downsized all 
across Europe. As a result, orders and other 
investments are being cancelled and 
modernisation plans delayed. On top of that, 
there is also a definite risk of losing important 
market shares, especially in East Asia and Latin 
America – and in a domain in which European 
industry is still quite competitive. 
In order to tackle all these challenges, it would 
be crucial to overcome the current market 
fragmentation by limiting (and ideally putting an 
end to) the persisting practice of doing it all at 
national level. Harmonising military 
requirements, pooling and sharing, role 
specialisation, exploiting potential untapped civil-
military synergies: all these buzzwords have now 
to be translated into realities. A number of good 
and relevant proposals have been put forward in 
various fora: what is required now is more and 
decisive action. 
Although the main responsibility for the 
necessary reforms will remain with the Member 
States, the Commission has the powers and the 
means to accompany, support and encourage the 
much  needed  t r ans fo rma t ion  and 
“Europeanisation” of the defence sector.  
With the entry into force of the two defence 
directives on procurement (2009/81/EC) and 
transfers (2009/43/EC), in fact, the regulatory 
basis is now partially secured for a European 
Defence Equipment Market. The de facto 
exemption of national defence and “sensitive” 
security procurement from the rules of the Single 
Market (long permitted by art.296 TEC, now 
art.346 TFEU) may soon be coming to an end. 
These new rules would also allow strengthen 
Europe’s industrial and technological base and 
boost cooperation and 
coordination among the EU-
27. 
Fragmentation, however, does 
not affect only European 
defence markets. Competences 
and resources, too, are spread 
across the EU institutional 
board and, arguably, even 
within institutions. Decade-old 
i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l 
arrangements – and fresh 
bilateral ones – coexist and 
overlap with the activities of 
the European Defence Agency 
(EDA) and the work on “pooling and sharing” 
carried out by the EEAS. Inside the Commission, 
market regulation and controls fall within 
different DGs, and so do relevant spending 
programmes and support for R & T. If the goal is 
to streamline and mainstream our efforts and to 
equip Europe for the challenges of the 21st 
century – starting with the 2020 horizon – some 
homework and housekeeping may have to be 
done also at these levels. 
1 A common D-Drive for the Union? 
By Antonio Missiroli* 
Global Defence Expediture by Region, % of GDP, 2008-2010
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Last but not least, significant 
differences exist among the EU-
27, as also the figures in this 
issue of BEPA Monthly Brief – 
elaborated from the 2012 edition 
of “The Military Balance” 
published by the London-based 
International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (www.iiss.org) –    
show. 
Against this background, a 
convincing common narrative 
could help overcome imbalances 
and, yet again, generate synergies. 
The EU may have a good story 
to tell after all – and its citizens may be willing to 
listen to it even in the midst of a crisis. 
A story worth being (fore)told 
The global security context is evolving very 
rapidly. More than ever before, addressing the 
new challenges emerging both close to and far 
from Europe requires a combination of military 
and non-military tools, as also our American 
allies now tend to acknowledge. The 
“comprehensive approach” to security is an old 
leitmotiv for the EU and surely not one to be 
ditched now – yet shrinking public resources risk 
undermining its impact and credibility. 
Pooling and sharing is also a way of preserving 
and saving – both resources and capabilities. The 
concept behind what the French call 
“mutualisation” permits to achieve economies of 
scale by applying policies of scale at trans-national 
level – through appropriate incentives, increased 
cross-border cooperation, role specialisation and 
the opening of national markets to EU-wide 
competition. 
By contrast, the “costs of non-Europe” – of 
failing or missing integration – are already 
apparent also in the D-sector. It may therefore be 
worthwhile to consider what a “smart, sustainable 
and inclusive” European defence industrial base 
may include and imply – to borrow (especially) 
from Europe 2020 but also in part from NATO’s 
2010 Strategic Concept. 
Inclusiveness comes with the very notion of 
pooling and sharing. Despite some inevitable 
short-term consolidation, more integrated 
policies and markets may bring higher, and 
above all, more sustainable employment rates in 
the medium and long run. Yet also 
environmental sustainability proper may be 
factored in, as the recent “Go 
Green” initiative by the EDA 
suggests. 
In principle, role specialisation 
entails deeper political integration 
(top-down); yet much can be 
achieved a l ready through 
functional integration among like-
minded countries (bottom-up), 
provided all these “islands of 
cooperation” – as CER Tomas 
Valasek likes to call them – come 
to const i tute  a  cohesive 
archipelago. These could, and 
indeed should be seen as 
Value of Global Arms Deliveries by Supplier, US$m, 2003-2010
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“flagship initiatives” concurring 
to a common goal. 
A more efficient, competitive and 
integrated defence industry is also 
crucial to provide higher levels of 
security of supply to all 
Europeans in a globalised but 
increasingly unpredictable world. 
True, there is no visible 
existential security threat to 
Europe (which makes it harder 
for citizens to accept raising 
public expenditure on military 
equipment and personnel). But 
there certainly are still risks, hazards and 
challenges – including that of being unable to 
protect  ourselves and secure our 
neighbourhoods, especially now that American 
forces are gradually redeploying elsewhere.  
Building a liberal and peaceful order around the 
EU (both East and South) requires precisely the 
kind of “comprehensive approach” for which 
adequate means need to be mobilised – failing 
which, the negative repercussions of instability 
and conflict nearby would affect first and 
foremost our own societies and economies. This, 
too, is a story worth telling our citizens: a certain 
degree of strategic autonomy and capacity to act 
is a precondition for shaping our environment 
and protecting our values and interests.  
Finally, there are many evident reasons to aim at 
a smart EU defence sector – an ambition that is 
not only compatible but mutually reinforcing 
with NATO’s own. Why not set indicative 
targets to this end, e.g. a minimal threshold for 
investment in R & T, possibly involving also (at 
least for dual use technologies) recourse to EU 
funds and/or the EIB? The “project bonds” 
concept launched by President Barroso could 
well be extended to this domain, facilitating also 
the establishment of targeted public-private 
partnerships.  
By the same token, why not learn from NATO’s 
experience with the AWACS surveillance aircraft 
and set up ad hoc consortia and facilities for 
creating and managing “common assets” (e.g. for 
air-to-air refuelling and field hospitals) which 
could be used also for humanitarian operations? 
 And why not aim, too, at promoting European 
“centres of excellence” for defence equipment 
and/or niche productions (an idea already 
floated i.a. by DG ENTR), thus giving a clear 
sense of direction to the industrial consolidation 
process that may have to continue in some 
sectors?  
All this would be fully in line not only 
with the objectives of Europe 2020 but 
also with the criteria set for Permanent 
Structured Cooperation in the Lisbon 
Treaty (art.46) as well as with the broader 
strategic priorities of the EU economy. 
 But it will be hardly achievable without a 
readiness by all relevant institutions and 
stakeholders to act in cooperative mode 
– and build a common (though not a 
single) D-Drive for Europe. 
Defence Expenditure, EU 27, % of GDP, 2008-2010
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When the first men in uniform arrived in the Justus 
Lipsius building in 1999, right after the entry into 
force of the Amsterdam Treaty, a shockwave went 
through Brussels’ corridors. The true believers in 
the methode Monnet were confronted with the 
challenge of reconciling the traditional logic of 
European integration – based on transferring (or 
rather moving) national competences to the EC/
EU level – with the growing demand for the Union 
to be(come) a security actor. Today, 13 years and 23 
missions and operations later, the Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP) has become a EU 
trademark.  
Europeans, however, are still struggling with the 
notion of power, albeit in a different way than in 
1999. Whereas the threat analysis enshrined in the 
2003 European Security Strategy remains 
worryingly valid, the willingness and the ability of 
the EU member states to project their military and 
civilian assets abroad are eroding. Almost all 
European countries had to undergo substantial 
force reductions and significant cuts in their 
defence budgets.  
In addition, the US is moving towards a reduced 
force presence in Europe, rebalancing its focus 
towards the Asia/Pacific and the Middle East and 
thus expecting Europeans to do more, especially in 
their own neighbourhood. The credibility of the 
CSDP is very much at stake now. Europeans must 
be able to show the political will to act, and the EU 
should be prepared to spell this out in a strong 
European narrative for the upcoming NATO 
summit in Chicago.  
Pool, share and combine 
Europe must be self-confident enough to live up 
to its level of ambition in the field of foreign and 
security policy as set out by the Lisbon Treaty. 
Each crisis is an opportunity and, despite all 
budgetary constraints, the EU has managed to 
revitalise the process of developing its military 
capabilities. The so-called “Pooling & Sharing” 
initiative is beginning to bear fruit. At the latest 
meeting of EU defence ministers, on 22 March, a 
promising catalogue of projects was presented, 
encompassing air-to-air refuelling (a critical 
capability whose importance was clearly 
demonstrated by the Libya air campaign of 2011), 
medical support, helicopter pilot training, maritime 
surveillance. We cannot afford duplication and 
uncoordinated national spending in Europe. 
Pooling and sharing military assets should become 
a reflex, a rule rather than an exception. Avoiding 
duplication would also facilitate complementarity 
with NATO. It goes without saying that a truly 
European integrated approach to capability 
development can only be achieved on the basis of 
mutual trust and guaranteed access.  
Crisis management capabilities, be they civilian or 
military, are not an end in themselves. The EU is 
not a defence alliance and should capitalise on its 
competitive advantage, i.e. the ability to deploy all 
foreign policy instruments in a coordinated 
fashion. The notion of “comprehensive approach” 
– also known as “the 3Ds”: diplomacy, 
development and defence – has become a leitmotiv 
of the European External Action Service and has 
already been successfully applied in practice. In the 
Horn of Africa, European navies have been 
escorting aid vessels and chasing pirates while EU 
soldiers have been training Somali recruits.  
On top of that, the Union as a whole remains the 
main donor of development assistance in the area 
and will soon assist the countries in the region in 
developing their own capacity to police their 
territorial waters. These actions combined will 
allow to tackle the root causes – and not just the 
symptoms and the effects – of piracy. 
The CSDP is in high demand and the Lisbon 
Treaty has created a new framework that fully 
integrates it in the external relations system of the 
EU. If the added value of the Treaty is to be 
exploited to the full, the EU foreign and security 
policy has to be joined up by default, so to speak: 
whether we plan a military CSDP operation or the 
use of a foreign policy instrument, we all need to 
look beyond our respective comfort zones and try 
to see the bigger picture. EEAS officials are 
certainly not surprised to work with their 
colleagues in uniforms: as a matter of fact, they 
would find it strange not to.  
2 A new narrative for CSDP 
By Maciej Popowski*  
* Maciej Popowski is Deputy Secretary-General of the European External Action Service. 
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Europe is facing difficult times with most 
Member States having to deal with the “perfect 
storm” of an economic downturn and a crisis in 
the financial markets. No doubt, public debt and 
the consolidation of state finances are today the 
most important challenges in Europe and will 
certainly remain so in the foreseeable future. 
In such a financial and political environment, it 
does not come as a surprise that many Member 
States have significantly reduced their defence 
budgets. Unfortunately, there is little hope that 
this tendency will be reversed any time soon. The 
consequent lack of resources to invest in new 
major defence and research programmes is 
putting into question Europe’s capability to 
produce the next generation of military 
equipment. This is not just an issue for each 
Member State but for Europe’s ambition for its 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). 
This was a point President Barroso strongly made 
in his State of the Union speech last September 
where he committed the Commission, within its 
competences, to do all it could to develop the 
single market and industrial base in the European 
defence sector. 
The need for an effective CSDP is just as strong 
as it has ever been, with Europe facing a wide 
range of threats in the form of terrorism, 
international piracy and regional instability. The 
means to deal with these threats increasingly 
require state-of-the-art technology – e.g. 
communications and surveillance – and the use of 
highly mobile and well equipped professional 
forces. None of this is cheap.  
States and markets 
Market structures to generate the capabilities the 
CSDP needs are far from optimal. Even small 
Member States still try to maintain a maximum 
range of military capabilities on a national basis. 
Moreover, most defence purchases are done 
purely nationally and, wherever possible, 
preference is given to national suppliers – 
resulting in costly duplications and inefficiencies. 
The cuts in defence budgets and the fragmented 
defence markets are already adversely affecting 
Europe’s military capabilities and Europe’s 
Defence Technological and Industrial Base. For 
the time being, many European defence 
companies are still doing well, with exports to 
third countries compensating (at least partly) for 
shrinking home markets. This proves that 
European industries are, in many areas, at the 
cutting edge of technology and competitive also 
on a global scale. However, current strengths are 
the fruits of investments which were made many 
years ago. The challenge today is to maintain, in 
spite of severe budget constraints, the capacity to 
develop – at affordable prices – the military 
capabilities of tomorrow. 
Europe needs to tackle the fragmented nature of 
its defence market. To achieve this objective, far 
reaching structural reforms are necessary. As long 
as defence and security remain national 
prerogatives, the main responsibility for reforms 
will rest (in most areas) with the Member States. 
In this context, it is crucial to consolidate the 
demand side and to ensure jointly the necessary 
investments in key future-oriented technologies. 
The European Defence Agency (EDA) has a 
major role to play in this area. 
The Commission’s task (force) 
The Commission can act via its regulatory power 
and its competences in policy areas which have, 
directly or indirectly, a bearing on defence 
markets and industries.  
The most prominent examples of this are the two 
Directives on defence procurement and defence 
transfers which were adopted in 2009. These 
Directives introduce specific EU legislation and 
the principles of the Internal Market into national 
defence markets. They streamline regulatory 
frameworks, enhance EU-wide competition and 
foster cooperation. In short, these Directives are 
today the regulatory backbone of a European 
Defence Equipment Market. 
3 Defending European defence: The Commission’s role 
By Daniel Calleja-Crespo* and Pierre Delsaux** 
*Daniel Calleja-Crespo is Director-General for Enterprise and Industry and ** Pierre Delsaux Deputy Director-General for Internal Market 
and Services in the European Commission. 
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Moreover, the Commission has recently set up a 
Defence Task Force which aims at further 
strengthening the defence market and industries. 
The establishment of this Task Force was 
initiated last summer by Vice-President Tajani 
and Commissioner Barnier, with strong support 
from President Barroso. 
The Task Force is first and foremost a 
Commission initiative and project. However, we 
are fully aware that progress can only be 
achieved if all stakeholders are involved. 
Consequently, the External Action Service and 
the EDA are closely associated to the work of 
the Task Force. In many areas, discussions will 
also be held directly with Member States. Last 
but not least, a hearing with industry and other 
stakeholders is also in the pipeline. 
The Defence Task Force is in its early stages, but 
three priority areas are already emerging: internal 
market; industrial policy; and research and 
innovation. 
With regard to the internal market, we are focusing 
on ensuring the effective transposition and 
implementation of the legislation and related 
areas. In this context, the phasing out of offsets 
is particularly important. Moreover, we will work 
towards an effective market monitoring 
mechanism and assess how the Commission can 
contribute, with its regulatory power, to the 
Union’s long-term security of supply.  
In the industrial policy domain, we are 
concentrating on the need to develop, with all 
the concerned stakeholders, a European 
approach to the restructuring of the defence 
industry, including its social impact. Such an 
approach needs to be based on increased 
interdependence and the development of 
European “centres of excellence”. Leaving 
restructuring simply to market forces and 
national initiatives risks losing essential 
capabilities and technologies, whereas 
cooperation and specialisation are the only way 
to maintain them.  
Moreover, we are also analysing what we can do 
to support the SMEs in this sector. SMEs are an 
important source of employment and innovation 
in all sectors, and defence is no exception. 
However, with the current fragmented nature of 
the defence market, SMEs find it particularly 
difficult to access other Member States markets.  
Finally, with research and innovation we plan to 
explore what can be done to limit the impact of 
the cuts in funding for defence R&D, which is 
an essential element of industry competiveness. 
The main objective is to develop greater 
synergies between dual technologies funded in 
the different Commission’s research 
programmes and the defence research agenda of 
the EDA.   
We should not necessarily spend more but we 
must definitely spend better together. Even if the 
industry needed to go through further 
restructuring, doing this with a collective 
understanding of Europe’s capability 
requirements would allow us look to Defence 
still playing a critical role in generating the 
technologies and skill-intensive jobs on which 
Europe’s industrial future depends.  
The objective of the Task Force is to ensure that 
the Commission does all it can to support 
Member States to achieve this objective. 
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Four Scenarios for the Reinvention of 
Europe 
The report elaborates a new framework for 
understanding Europe’s efficiency and legitimacy 
crises, and examines the political and legal 
obstacles to a solution in different member 
states, the new cultural divisions in Europe, and 
the rise of new populist forces (including a 
discussion of the new German and British 
questions). It sets out four scenarios for solving 
the euro crisis without exacerbating the chronic 
crisis of declining European power: asymmetric 
integration by working around the existing 
treaties; a smaller, more integrated eurozone 
based on the existing treaties; political union 
through treaty change; and a deal among a new 
vanguard through a Schengen-style treaty. There 
are also calls to strengthen each of the three 
traditional channels for democratic participation 
in order to restore legitimacy: European 
elections, referendums and national opt-outs. 
h t t p : / / w w w . e c f r . e u / p a g e / - /
ECFR43_REINVENTION_OF_EUROPE_ES
SAY_AW1.pdf 
Long live the United States of Europe 
The global financial crisis is forcing Europe to 
become an ever closer union. While EU member 
states still hold onto this idea, many EU citizens 
continue to be sceptical. The situation calls for a 
new approach to how we think about the future 
of Europe and how we act for Europe. The 
report argues that there is a need for the United 
States of Europe. The author claims that 
“solidarity, security and strength are the 
cornerstones upon which the United States of 
Europe should be built.” He emphasises that 
democratic efficiency, economic stability, 
solidarity as well as social cohesion are principles 
already set out in the EU Treaties. All that 
remains to be done is to put them into practice. 
http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/
x b c r / S I D - 4 3 E 9 8 F B 7 - 3 D 0 3 7 3 3 0 / b s t /
xcms_bst_dms_35831__2.pdf 
Poland’s U-turn on European defence:  
A missed opportunity? 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Poland 
has been on a permanent quest for “insurance 
policies” in order to strengthen its security. 
Worried about Russia’s intentions, Poland saw 
NATO as its primary insurance policy for about 
two decades. Now, with the United States 
withdrawing from European security, Poland is 
attempting to broaden its security guarantees, 
including through an unprecedented 
commitment to EU defence cooperation. During 
its EU presidency, Poland tried to reinvigorate 
the EU’s defence efforts, but the EU countries 
have remained reluctant to increase cooperation 
among their armed forces. In failing to respond 
to Poland’s proposals on EU defence, European 
governments are missing an opportunity to 
improve European military cooperation, which 
could lead Poland to give up on its European 
allies and undermine the stability of Europe.  
h t t p ://www.cer . o r g . uk/s i t e s/d e f au l t/ f i l e s/
p u b l i c a t i o n s / a t t a c h m e n t s / p d f / 2 0 1 2 /
pb_poland_9march12-4791.pdf  
Options for EU engagement in post-conflict 
Libya 
The EU’s initial response to the Libyan crisis was 
weak and divided: it failed to speak with one voice 
and to respond to the need for military crisis 
management. While the UN and NATO have been 
the main players in the first months of the Libyan 
civil war, the EU is expected to step up its civilian 
support to post-conflict reconstruction. This policy 
brief analyses the most serious medium- and long-
term challenges for (re-)building a functioning 
Libyan state. It examines options for EU 
engagement in the area of security sector reform 
taking into account lessons learned from previous 
CSDP missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 
policy brief concludes that the establishment of a 
civilian CSDP mission providing training mainly 
outside Libya will be the most feasible option. 
h t t p :// tepsa . b e/TEPSA%20br i e f%20by%
20Marlene%20Gottwald%20March%202012.pdf 
4 Think Tank Twitter 
Think Tank Twitter (TTT) aims to provide regular information and updates on what is produced by think tanks and research centres across 
Europe (and beyond) on EU policy issues. As an analogy to the original Twitter, each summary – or tweet – does not exceed 140 words, rather 
than characters. Those who wish to signal new publications for possible inclusion can send them to the email address bepa-think-tank-
twitter@ec.europa.eu 
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The European Union and India: Partners in 
democracy promotion? 
In the context of the 12th EU-India Summit, EU 
and Indian leaders took stock of the state of 
their strategic partnership. Among other, they 
discussed events and developments in North 
Africa and possibilities of assisting the ongoing 
changes in the region. The author holds that 
engaging India in this context will require a 
better understanding of its approach to 
democracy support and a frank dialogue about 
the differences between the EU and India in this 
particular area. The report then explains the 
reasons for these divergences and indentifies 
possible avenues for cooperation. It argues that 
different approaches to democracy should be 
considered as complimentary rather than 
contradicting. The EU and India can work 
together on very specific issues, even if the 
differences may be impossible to bridge. 
http://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=9511 
 
Making the European Stability Mechanism 
Work 
The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
represents the most ambitious regional financing 
arrangement to date. It is an important 
institutional step in the right direction, but one 
can already see its limits. The mechanism as 
currently conceived remains too small in scale to 
provide reassurance that firewalls are 
impregnable, and its design fails to draw 
sufficiently on key lessons from crisis 
management. Europe’s leaders must move 
decisively to shore up the mechanism’s available 
capital to a credible critical mass, ensure 
predictable and readily deployable instruments, 
and devise a governance structure that is able to 
respond swiftly to fast-moving crisis situations. 
The ESM is an important step. But a systemic 
crisis in the globalised economic and financial 
world requires a global approach, such as the 
establishment of a Global Stabilisation 
Mechanism. 
http://www.lisboncouncil.net/in-the-news/355-new-
policy-brief-making-the-european-stability-mechanism-
work.html  
 
Greece and Portugal: Similar fundamentals 
but different outcomes? 
While Portugal is far from being in the same dire 
situation as Greece in terms of its levels of public 
debt and deficit, excess private consumption is a 
real problem in Portugal. The private sector has 
spent much more than its income and the net 
foreign debt is worth more than 100 percent of 
GDP. Although this excess spending was 
financed by banks, this private debt will 
eventually become a public one. In order to 
ensure that income and spending levels are 
compatible, the Portuguese authorities must 
combine structural reforms – aiming to lower 
public debt – with the control of banking 
systems. If this problem is not addressed, the 
eurozone might soon have another country in 
need of debt forgiveness. 
http://www.ceps.eu/book/greece-and-portugal-similar-
fundamentals-different-outcomes 
 
 
The End of Climate Policy as We Knew It 
The first attempt to seal a global and legally 
binding treaty on climate change failed in 2009 in 
Copenhagen. Subsequent meetings in Cancun 
and Durban exacerbated the crisis of the global 
top-down approach to share the remaining 
carbon budget among 194 nations. It is unlikely 
that the climate change conference in 2015 will 
deliver a global treaty. The EU is responsible for 
one tenth of global emissions and urgently needs 
a Plan B. Measuring the progress of 
decarbonisation of major economies is required 
to save instruments like the Emission Trading 
System. The endurance of the strict (2 degrees 
centigrade) border between safe and dangerous 
climate change is not a given; adaptation will gain 
importance. The EU should regard climate 
policy as “politics” and admit that “optimal” 
solutions are not feasible. 
http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/
p r o d u c t s /
research_papers/2012_RP01_lpt_prt.pdf#page=19  
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Arrivées 
Arrivée le 1er mars, Martina Gunda est en 
charge des conférences et réunions dans l’unité 
de coordination.  
Trois nouveaux stagiaires ont rejoint le BEPA 
le 6 mars pour cinq mois: Niklas Heusch 
(équipe Analyse), Erik Olsson (projet ESPAS) 
et Carole Richard (équipe Outreach).  
Carmen Fernandez-Tresguerrez est venue 
renforcer depuis le 16 mars le secrétariat de 
l’équipe analyse du BEPA. Le 16 mars 
également, Jan Marco Mueller de la DG 
Recherche et Innovation a rejoint l’équipe 
scientifique du BEPA pour soutenir la 
Conseillère scientifique en chef.  
Nous leur souhaitons la bienvenue. 
Evénements 
Le 6 mars, le BEPA et l’Ordre Souverain de 
Malte ont organisé conjointement un séminaire 
ayant pour thème la “Protection des lieux 
sacrés de la Méditerranée, une contribution au 
dialogue interculturel”, auquel le Président 
Barroso et la Commissaire Vassiliou ont 
participé. Les discussions ont porté sur l’accès 
et la protection juridique des lieux sacrés ayant 
une signification culturelle universelle.  
Le même jour, la taskforce ESPAS s’est réunie 
afin de discuter du processus de mise en œuvre 
et du financement. La prochaine étape de cette 
taskforce sera le lancement de la décision 
financière de l’action préparatoire.  
Le 14 mars, le BEPA a participé à la 
conclusion des ateliers “Open Dialogue 
between Institutions and Citizens: Chances and 
Challenges” organisés par l’Austrian Institute 
for European Law and Policy, afin de faire part 
aux participants du dialogue de la Commission 
européenne avec les citoyens et la société civile 
(Ar t i c l e  11  TUE) .  Le  méd ia teur 
Diamandouros, également présent, a fait part 
de la volonté d’ouverture et de transparence 
des institutions européennes envers la société 
civile.  
Le 15 mars, le BEPA a organisé conjointement 
avec Carnegie Europe un séminaire pour 
discuter des perspectives sur les relations entre 
l’Union européenne et les pays du Printemps 
arabe. Réunissant des participants travaillant 
dans les institutions européennes, des think 
tanks et diplomates, il a été question du clivage 
laïcité-islamisme et de la manière dont l’Union 
européenne pouvait aider ces pays, sans 
ingérence, à conduire le processus de transition 
démocratique.  
Les 20 et 21 mars s’est déroulée la rencontre 
mensuelle du Groupe européen d’éthique 
(EGE), lors de laquelle plusieurs auditions sur 
le nouvel avis sur l’éthique et l’énergie ont été 
menées. L’EGE a aussi rencontré Prof. Anne 
Glover, la Conseillère scientifique en chef du 
Président Barroso, avec laquelle il a été décidé 
de créer des synergies de travail, ainsi que la 
Commissaire Kroes afin de discuter de l’avis 
de l’EGE sur l’éthique des technologies de 
l’information et de communication. 
Le 22 mars, le BEPA et le German Marshall 
Fund of the US ont animé un séminaire 
rassemblant des fonctionnaires de la 
Commission européenne, du SEAE et de think 
tanks, et portant sur les “Global Swing States”, 
c’est-à-dire les puissances émergentes 
démocratiques sur lesquelles l’UE et les Etats-
Unis pourraient s’appuyer pour défendre un 
ordre international fondé sur les règles de la 
bonne gouvernance. Une des conclusions 
principales de ce débat a été que l’Occident 
devrait s’adapter au nouvel ordre mondial 
plutôt que d’essayer de continuer à imposer 
son modèle.  
Le 22 mars s’est également tenue la conférence 
“Le cadre financier pluriannuel de l’UE et les 
ressources propres” afin de parler du budget 
2014-2020 de l’Union européenne. Cette 
deuxième Conférence de haut niveau avec des 
parlementaires nationaux, coparrainée par le 
Parlement européen, la présidence danoise du 
Conseil, la Commission européenne, était 
consacrée à l’étude de nouvelles ressources 
propres de l’UE et à l’utilisation du prochain 
5 BEPA News 
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cadre financier pluriannuel comme un outil 
d’investissement stratégique. Les Présidents de 
la Commission et du Parlement européens et la 
Première ministre du Danemark ont fait part 
de leurs vues concernant ce prochain cadre 
financier pluriannuel.  
Enfin le 30 mars le BEPA a organisé avec la 
Commission des conférences épiscopales de la 
communauté européenne (COMECE) et la 
Conférence des Églises européennes (CEC) un 
séminaire dans le contexte du dialogue prévu 
par l’Article 17 sur “La liberté de religion: un 
droit fondamental dans un monde en mutation 
rapide”. D’éminents experts des Eglises, de la 
Commission et du SEAE ont discuté de la 
liberté de religion en Europe et au-delà de ses 
frontières.  
 
 
Activités à venir 
Dans le dialogue instauré par l’Article 17, le 
BEPA organise le 23 avril avec l’Association 
européenne de la pensée libre (EAFT) un 
colloque sur le Printemps arabe. Le colloque 
réunira environ 150 représentants de l’EAFT, 
de la Commission et du SEAE qui échangeront 
sur le thème: “Un partenariat pour la 
démocratie et la prospérité: promouvoir les 
droits et libertés démocratiques dans les pays 
du Sud de la Méditerranée”.  
Le 25 avril, le BEPA organisera en partenariat 
avec l’Open Society Institute (Bruxelles) et le 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (Berlin), un 
séminaire sur le populisme. Les panelistes 
discuteront des facteurs conduisant au 
populisme ainsi que de la manière de répondre 
au populisme.  
Helle Thorning-Schmidt, Première Ministre danoise, Présidente du Conseil de l’Union Européenne; Martin 
Schulz, Président du Parlement Européen; et José Manuel Barroso, Président de la Commission Européenne, 
lors de la conférence du 22 mars sur le cadre financier pluriannuel et les ressources propres de l’Union. 
